Infrastructure report cardTop 500K site

nih.gov

75 out of 10015 passed6 to improve

Checked 2 days ago· Grading…

HTTPS & TLSA

Certificate, protocol, redirect, HSTS88

DNSA⁺

Name servers, DNSSEC, CAA, registration100

EmailB

SPF, DMARC, MTA-STS, DKIM79

Web & networkF

Security headers, IPv6, RPKI13

DependenciesA⁺

How much hangs on one company100

HTTPS & TLS

88/100A

TLS versionTLS 1.22/4
Negotiates TLS 1.2 at best; TLS 1.3 is faster and drops old ciphers.
HTTP/2 and HTTP/3HTTP/1.10/2
Only HTTP/1.1: no multiplexing, slower pages.
HTTPS certificateGoDaddy.com, Inc.10/10
HTTPS with a valid certificate from GoDaddy.com, Inc..
Certificate expiry1244/4
The certificate is valid for another 124 days.
Old protocols3/3
Refuses the retired TLS 1.0 and 1.1.
Key strengthRSA 20482/2
A strong key: RSA 2048.
HTTP → HTTPSclosed3/3
Plain HTTP (port 80) does not answer, so nothing is ever served unencrypted.
HSTS1 year4/4
HSTS tells browsers to use HTTPS only, for 1 year.

DNS

100/100A⁺

Name servers34/4
3 name servers for the domain.
Name servers answer3/35/5
Every name server answers for the domain, with the same version of the zone.
DNSSECRSASHA2563/3
Signed with DNSSEC: resolvers can tell forged answers from real ones.
CAA recordsamazon.com, globalsign.com, sectigo.com, digicert.com, identrust.com, letsencrypt.org, entrust.net, godaddy.com2/2
CAA records name the authorities allowed to issue its certificates.

Email

79/100B

MTA-STS0/2
No MTA-STS: mail to the domain can be read in transit by stripping its encryption.
TLS reporting0/0.5
No TLS reporting: failed encrypted deliveries go unnoticed.
SPF~all4/5
SPF lists the servers allowed to send its mail and marks the rest as suspicious (~all).
DMARCreject7/7
DMARC tells receivers to reject mail that fakes the domain (p=reject).
DKIMselector12/2
A DKIM key is published (selector selector1), so its mail can be signed.

Web & network

13/100F

IPv60/4
nih.gov has no IPv6 address: IPv6-only networks reach it only through translation.
RPKIunknown1/4
The route to the website is not covered by RPKI, so a hijack of it cannot be told apart.
Security headers
The website did not answer the check, so its headers are not graded.

Dependencies

100/100A⁺

DNS providersSelf-hosted5/5
DNS is served from 2 separate networks.
One company for everything5/5
The website, DNS and email do not all hang on one company.

Who runs it

Website: NIH-NET
DNS: Self-hosted
Email: Self-hosted

Routes

156.40.0.0/16AS3527RPKI unknown

Name servers

ns.nih.govSelf-hostedAS3527
ns2.nih.govSelf-hostedAS3527
ns3.nih.govSelf-hostedAS30387

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What is graded

HTTPS & TLS · 25%

A valid certificate (an invalid one means F), its expiry against its lifetime, TLS 1.3, no TLS 1.0/1.1 (else at most B), http:// sent straight to https://, HSTS, HTTP/2.

DNS · 20%

At least two name servers that all answer and agree, DNSSEC, CAA records, and a registration that is not about to expire.

Email · 20%

SPF, a DMARC policy that rejects forgeries (none means at most B), MTA-STS and TLS reporting for domains that take mail, DKIM at common selectors.

Web & network · 20%

Content Security Policy, nosniff, framing protection, Referrer- and Permissions-Policy, IPv6, and an RPKI-valid route (invalid means at most C).

Dependencies · 15%

DNS from more than one provider, and the website, DNS and email not all with one company.

A+ 95–100 · A 85–94 · B 75–84 · C 65–74 · D 50–64 · F below 50